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CMO is suitable to license works under ECL provisions, however. In particular, the
legitimacy of any agreement crucially relies on the ‘‘representativeness’’ of the
CMO. This article focuses on the notion of representativeness of CMOs. On the
basis of current European and national legislation, we argue that the representative
character of a CMO encompasses three essential elements to be considered from the
perspective of the rights owners: (1) the CMO must have a broad membership
among the potential rights owners in the market it serves; (2) it must have a proper
mandate from the rights owners in terms of category of works and rights covered;
and (3) it must take appropriate measures to reach and inform (non-)members about
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1 Introduction
In recent years, numerous projects across the EU have focused on the large-scale
digitisation of cultural heritage materials. These projects are usually carried out by
cultural heritage institutions (CHIs). In line with their mandate, their aim is to
preserve and make available cultural assets, implying that the focus is on older
materials that would not otherwise be accessible. Copyright law is a crucial
component of these digitisation efforts. Much of the 20th century material held by
CHIs in their collections is still in copyright due to the long terms of protection.1 In
particular for works that are no longer available through the usual commercial
channels, digitisation has benefits for everyone: the right holders receive income not
otherwise available; the CHIs are able to continue to fulfil their public interest
mission; while the public gains access to previously unavailable works.2 As
European CHIs cannot rely on copyright exemptions to digitise works and make
them accessible online,3 they instead must seek a license from the right holder. In
principle, licensing a work requires three distinct steps: (a) identifying and locating
the owner(s) of rights, (b) negotiating a price, and (c) monitoring and enforcement.
Each one of these steps imposes a cost on either the licensor or the licensee.4 As a
result, this process can be very onerous for both parties: the user must invest
resources in locating the rights owner and negotiating the license; and the right
holder must bear part of the negotiation cost, in addition to the cost imposed by the
monitoring and enforcement of the license. If the costs of rights clearance are
greater than the expected benefits of digitisation, works will not be digitised –
irrespective of the technological possibilities.5
The problem of having to provide licenses to a large number of users is not new
and has traditionally been solved by Collective Management Organisations
(CMOs). In essence, they collect the royalties for high-volume but low-value
non-exclusive uses, such as performance of a work in public or its online
exploitation.6 CMOs are in practice the major licensing intermediary between the
right holder and the user. In general terms, CMOs manage the rights of their
members and permit their use by licensees based on a set of defined tariffs in return
for payment. The role of CMOs in the licensing process can be best understood as a
way of outsourcing the licensing process to a third party. CMOs work on the basis of
assignment of rights, whereby authors assign their rights to the CMO upon
1 Gomez and Keller (2015).
2 Bensamoun (2014), p. 215.
3 The license has to cover the reproduction and making available right under Arts. 2 and 3 InfoSoc
Directive. At the same time, none of the exceptions covers mass digitisations projects.
4 Kretschmer (2005), p. 6.
5 Axhamn and Guibault (2011), p. 510.
6 Haunss (2013), p.1.
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becoming a member.7 On this basis, the CMO is entitled to grant licences to the
users, as well as to monitor and enforce the users’ compliance with these licences,
relieving the right holder of this duty. In other words, CMOs ensure that users pay
according to the rules.
CMOs rarely cover all possible rights owners within their jurisdiction, however.8
To make mass digitisation economically viable in practice, a solution must be found
in order to cover as many rights owners as possible, including non-members. In
principle, this can be achieved in one of three ways: (1) mandatory statutory
licensensing, (2) voluntary opt-in agreements, and (3) Extended Collective
Licensing (ECL) schemes.9 ECL is less intrusive than the first option while at the
same time still providing large scale coverage that opt-ins cannot achieve.10 ECL is
a form of exercise of rights whereby the law extends the application of freely
negotiated copyright licensing agreements between a user, like a CHI, and a CMO
to the rights of non-members of the organisation.11 Compared to standard collective
rights management, the ‘‘extension’’ of agreements to non-members of a CMO
significantly facilitates the licensing process, knowing that even if not all rights
owners are identified, license agreements can still be concluded and remuneration
paid, allowing the use to take place under specific conditions. At the same time, the
free negotiations between the CMO representing the right holders and the user
associations are likely to lead to higher remuneration levels than a compulsory
license system would.12
Not every CMO is suitable to license works under ECL provisions, however. In
particular, the legitimacy of any agreement crucially relies on the ‘‘representative-
ness’’ of the CMO. The representative character of the CMO is a question of
legitimacy towards the (non-)members of the CMO, as well as of legal certainty
towards the users: (1) a ‘‘representative’’ CMO will exercise the rights of a large
enough number of rights holders to legitimise the application of the agreement to all
rights owners, including non-members; while (2) a ‘‘representative’’ CMO will be
able to grant a licence with broad coverage of the repertoire which increases the
legal certainty for the users. A CMO that does not represent a sufficiently high
number of rights owners cannot claim to negotiate a legitimate agreement with users
on behalf of all rights holders, nor can it give any assurance to the user that the
repertoire covered is sufficient to reduce the risk of having a (large number of) non-
members opt-out from it.13
The principle of CMO representativeness comes back as a mantra every time the
suggestion is made to create an ECL regime to solve the copyright problems
associated with the use of out-of-commerce works by CHIs, including in the
7 The transfer can be exclusive or non-exclusive, depending on the legal context. It is usually exclusive
though.
8 For a detailed discussion, see below Sects. 2.1 and 2.2.
9 Busse (2018), p. 147.
10 Busse (2018), p. 147.
11 For a history of ECL schemes within Europe, please see Zhang (2016), pp. 658–661.
12 Axhamn and Guibault (2011), p. 513.
13 Guibault (2015), p. 173.
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Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market14 (DSM
Proposal). Without a sufficient degree of representativeness, ECLs indeed bear the
risk of becoming illegitimate. But what does ‘‘representativeness’’ of a CMO entail
in practice? When can one be satisfied that a CMO is sufficiently representative so
as to guarantee its legitimacy vis-a`-vis all rights owners? Until the publication of the
DSM Proposal in September 2016, the European legislature had devoted only scant
attention to the issue of representativeness of CMOs. Even Directive 2014/26/EC on
the Collective Management of Copyrights15 does not explicitly address the issue.
And while some aspects of the issue have been examined by the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) in the Soulier and Doke case,16 the question has yet to
be examined in depth.
This article focuses on the notion of representativeness of CMOs, generally and
as it relates to the implementation of an ECL regime in particular. The provisions
governing the use of out-of-commerce works by CHIs in the current DSM Proposal
are many years in the making. They find their origin in the Memorandum of
Understanding on Key Principles on the Digitisation and Making Available of Out-
of-Commerce Works (MoU),17 signed in 2011, between the relevant stakeholders in
the print sector, under the auspices of the European Commission. In addition, the
relationship between CMOs and their members has been subject to EU harmon-
isation in the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights
in musical works for online uses in the internal market.18 We argue that on the basis
of the MoU, the CMO Directive and the DSM Proposal, the representative character
of a CMO encompasses three essential elements to be considered from the
perspective of rights owners: (1) the CMO must have a broad membership among
the potential rights owners in the market it serves; (2) it must have a proper mandate
from the rights owners in terms of category of works and rights covered; and (3) it
must take appropriate measures to reach and inform (non-)members about the
exercise of rights.
The first part of this paper gives a brief description of the European legal
framework, including the MoU, the Directive of 2014 on the Collective
Management of Rights and the relevant provisions of the DSM Proposal. The
second part takes a look at the three constituting elements of the concept of
14 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital
Single Market – COM(2016)593 (DSM Directive), 14 September 2016, [hereinafter DSM Proposal],
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-directive-european-parliament-
and-council-copyright-digital-single-market.
15 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical
works for online use in the internal market [hereinafter CMO Directive], OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, pp. 72–98.
16 Case C-301/15, Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 November 2016 (Soulier
and Doke).
17 Memorandum of Understanding – Key Principles on the Digitisation and Making Available of Out-of-
Commerce Works [hereinafter MoU], Signed on 20 September 2011, principle 1, para. 1, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/20110920-mou_en.pdf.
18 CMO Directive.
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representativeness through the lens of EU law, in particular the CJEU in Soulier and
Doke. It is our reading of the CJEU’s decision in the Soulier and Doke case that the
Court dealt exclusively with the third component of representativeness, overlooking
the first two elements. Were this narrow interpretation of the notion of
representativeness to be followed in the future, it would risk seriously undermining
the required representative character of CMOs in general and those engaged in ECL
schemes in particular.
2 Out-of-Commerce Works: The Emergence of the ECL Solution
The question of ECL legitimacy is not new and has been discussed at EU level
before. Most notably, there are a number of soft and hard law instruments which
influence how representativeness should be interpreted. In this section, these
instruments will be analysed in terms of their content and how they relate to the
interpretation of when a CMO is representative.
2.1 The Memorandum of Understanding on the Use of Out-of-Commerce
Works
In the context of the stakeholder dialogue facilitated by the European Commission,
the right holders in books and CHIs agreed on a basic outline for mass digitisation.19
This first step towards the creation of a solution for the dissemination of out-of-
commerce (hereinafter OOC) books is the Memorandum of Understanding – Key
Principles on the Digitisation and Making Available of Out-of-Commerce Works, a
non-binding instrument of soft law.20 The MoU was meant as an enabler of
digitisation and easy online dissemination of OOC works to foster large-scale
digitisation initiatives.21 It was limited to books and articles that are ‘‘out-of-
commerce’’, meaning books and ‘‘learned’’ articles that are copyright-protected but
are no longer commercially available. Following the Nordic practice, the essence of
the MoU was to suggest an ECL model.22
The Key Principles set out in the MoU referred to all three elements of the
requirement of representativeness of CMOs involved in the digitisation and
dissemination of OOC books. With respect to the breadth of the membership,
Principle No. 2.1 states:
Licences for works that are out of commerce will only be granted by collective
management organisations in which a substantial number of authors and
publishers affected by the Agreement are members, and appropriately
represented in the key decision making bodies. [emphasis added]
19 Janssens and Tryggvadottir (2016), p. 203.
20 MoU, principle 1, para. 1. See also Janssens and Tryggvadottir (2016), p. 207.
21 Beunen and Guibault (2011), pp. 221–222.
22 For an explanation of the Nordic model, see Zhang (2016); or Hugenholtz et al. (2014).
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This language is modeled after the Nordic legislation regulating ECL regimes.
Accordingly, only those CMOs that already manage the type of work in question
(here books) by representing authors and publishers can benefit from the MoU. At
the same time, there is widespread recognition that the determination of what
constitutes a ‘‘substantial number’’ of rights owners has the potential of being highly
subjective. No further guidance is given on this crucial point.
However, the extended effect is subject to further efforts by the CMO. Principle
No. 2.4 specifies:
For the purpose of such an Agreement, where a rightholder whose work
was first published in a particular Member State has not transferred the
management of his rights to a collective management organisation, the
collective management organisation which manages rights of the same
category in that Member State of first publication shall be presumed to
manage the rights in respect of such work. In order to benefit from this
presumption the collective management organisation shall make its best
efforts to alert rightholders in question in accordance with information
procedure methods agreed upon with organisations representing righthold-
ers in the country where the collective management organisation is based.
The rightholder organisations will commit to assist the collective
management organisation in the work to alert authors and publishers.23
[emphasis added]
This provides information on the other two representativeness requirements. First,
the CMO in question needs to have a mandate from its members to manage the
relevant exclusive right (e.g. making available online). Secondly, only those CMOs
already working within the jurisdiction of first publication, the presumed home state
or permanent residence of the rights owner, are entitled to represent non-users.
Therefore, the MoU establishes that a CMO is the representative for a particular
member state and a certain type of work and right. This implies that representa-
tiveness is a question of degree which varies when the parameters change. It cannot
therefore be presumed that the same CMO is always the most suitable one. Instead,
any assessment has to be context dependant. There is no guidance, however, on
what this assessment would actually entail in practice.
Overall, the MoU covers all three points of representativeness as we
understand them: broad membership, a mandate to manage the right in question
(here making available), and information campaigns for non-members to ensure
that they can opt out if they wish. However, none of these points is given any
substance; they are only mentioned but not more closely defined. In addition, the
MoU also relies on the principle of national jurisdiction, reflecting the assumption
that coverage of a CMO in its own territory is larger than the coverage of any
other organisation.
23 MoU, Principle No. 2(4).
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2.2 The Collective Rights Management Directive
The 2014 CMO Directive24 does not discuss ECL schemes as such but adds to the
notion of representativeness because it shapes the relationship between the rights
owners and the CMO. In difference to the MoU, the CMO Directive is not
concerned with cultural heritage as such but ensures that all CMOs across the
European Union are bound by common standards of governance. It therefore
addresses a core issue in the (Digital) Single Market: CMOs are essential to the use
of copyright works because they lower the transaction costs involved by providing
licenses without the need to contact individual right holders while at the same time
ensuring that royalties reach the relevant right holders.25 In practice, the economic
benefit of CMOs is based on a legal or de facto monopoly,26 giving rise to
competition issues.27 As a result, the traditional EU-level approach is strongly
influenced by a competition paradigm which is also reflected in the CMO
Directive.28
In this context, the purpose of the Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-
territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market
is two-fold: first, to establish rules on transparency and good governance for the
collective management of copyright and related rights; and second, to create a legal
framework which promotes the development, in the field of music-making, of multi-
territory and multi-directory licensing by collective management organisations. In
the context of ECLs, it is the provisions on the relationship between the individual
right holders and the CMO which are most important.29
The CMO Directive clearly defines the rights of right holders vis-a`-vis a CMO.
Article 4 of the Directive insists that Member States ensure that
collective management organisations act in the best interests of the
rightholders whose rights they manage and that they do not impose on them
any obligations which are not objectively necessary for the protection of their
rights and interests or for the effective management of their rights.
This means any CMO is to be the least imposing it can be while maintaining an
efficient rights management regime. In other words, they are to represent the right
holder and act in his interests, not overriding his preferences unless it is objectively
necessary to do so for the benefit of all right holders collectively. One key area in
this respect is the mandate a right holder gives a CMO.
24 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical
works for online use in the internal market OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 72–98 (CMO Directive).
25 Haunss (2013), p. 1.
26 Drexl et al. (2013), p. 325.
27 For a detailed analysis, please see Kretschmer (2005), p. 7.
28 Schroff and Street (2017) for a historical overview and the influence of the competition paradigm.
29 Guibault (2014), p. 700.
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What a CMO can consider as its mandate is shaped by Art. 5. In principle, right
holders are free to choose any CMO within the EU, including dividing their rights,
categories of works and territory.30 The CMO in this case has to facilitate the choice
as it has the duty to actively inform its (prospective) member that they are free to
choose the CMO and are not bound by jurisdiction.31 It is therefore possible that the
same author assigns the rights in some works to CMO ‘‘A’’ but others to CMO ‘‘B’’.
In line with this, CMOs have to be clear about what kinds of rights they actually
manage and, ‘‘in cases where a rightholder authorises a collective management
organisation to manage his rights, he shall give consent specifically for each right or
category of rights or type of works and other subject-matter which he authorises the
collective management organisation to manage. Any such consent shall be
evidenced in documentary form’’.32 This is crucial for CMOs in particular because
all management claims by a CMO are based on these contracts and do not extend
beyond them. Furthermore, following from the freedom of choice, right assignments
are not static. For example, a right holder can withdraw from a CMO,33 irrespective
of whether he assigns the rights to another one.34 To reduce the negative impact of
these decisions on the right holder, he keeps the proceeds of withdrawn rights.35
Most notably in the context of digitisation projects, the CMO cannot prevent the
right holder from permitting non-commercial uses directly, even if he entrusted a
CMO with the management of the relevant right.36 Most large-scale digitisation
projects undertaken by CHIs would fall into this category, meaning that every right
holder can in principle give CHIs direct permission irrespective of the managing
CMO’s position.
The CMO Directive’s second relevant aspect for ECL schemes lies in its rules on
the treatment of non-members. While these are significantly less detailed than the
provisions on members, they nonetheless provide some guidance. First, CMOs are
required to actively identify and trace right holders when revenues are collected for
them.37 The aim is to ensure that all right holders receive their revenues within nine
months after the year the revenues are initially collected.38 Most notably, if they fail
to distribute the funds on time, the revenues are to be kept in a separate account for
at least three years,39 enabling future distribution. Right holders need to be actively
30 CMO Directive, Art. 5(2). According to the Directive, the CMO has a duty to manage rights unless
there are objectively justifiable reasons not to do so. One such reason could be high administrative costs
as established in the Daft Punk case, EC, 12 August 2002, Case COMP/C2/37.219, Banghalter and
Homem Christo v. SACEM.
31 CMO Directive, Art. 5(8).
32 CMO Directive, Art. 5(7).
33 CMO Directive, Art. 5(4).
34 CMO Directive, Art. 5(6).
35 CMO Directive, Art. 5(5).
36 CMO Directive, Art. 5(3). Metzger and Heinemann (2015).
37 CMO Directive, Art. 13(3).
38 CMO Directive, Art. 13(1).
39 CMO Directive, Art. 13(2) and (4). It should be noted here that the use of non-claimed revenues for
which the right holder could not be identified has to be decided by the General Assembly, in line with the
specific CMO’s statute of limitations. (Art. 13(5)).
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traced using all available options, first via other CMOs, public records and then via
the public.40 This explicitly also includes right holders who have withdrawn from a
CMO but are still owed revenues.41 In other words, CMOs are required under the
CMO Directive to treat non-members on the same basis as their own members in
respect to the collected revenues. They must actively trace members, and safeguards
are built in to ensure that uncollected revenues are not spent or redistributed for at
least three years, giving the non-member time to collect.
The protection of non-members in turn crucially depends on the third key area in
the CMO Directive when studied from the point of view of ECL schemes –
transparency. To ensure CMO actions are transparent to (non-)members, Chapter 5
of the CMO Directive sets minimum standards. A right holder who is not a member
of the CMO is treated under the CMO Directive as a member of the public, making
Art. 21 applicable. It lists the kinds of information any CMO has to make available
to the general public, referring mainly to the general organisational statutes (e.g.
articles of association and membership terms),42 aspects of revenue collection and
distribution (e.g. the tariff structures, distribution of revenues and deductions),43 as
well as details on the dispute resolution procedures.44 The second source of
information is in the transparency report, which each CMO is required to publish
within eight months after the financial year has ended.45 Under Part 2 of the Annex,
the transparency report must provide the overall income and costs associated with
the rights management.46 While the revenues and costs have to be divided by
category of work and right, it is essentially an aggregate. This means that it would
not allow an individual right holder to assess how much he is owed in the event of a
dispute. Overall, this information is designed to allow a right holder who is not a
member of the CMO in question to identify what the CMO licenses, with whom it
cooperates, how the revenue is calculated and where to turn to if there are issues. It
should be noted though that the actual amounts collected are not included in the
list.47
In summary, the primary importance of the CMO Directive for ECL schemes lies
in its provision on the mandate. A CMO mandate is based on the contracts between
the CMO and its members. They only cover what is explicitly listed and do not
extend beyond. This means for OOC schemes that only those CMOs which list the
digitising and making available rights explicitly in the statutes and membership
contracts qualify. There is no presumed extension of mandate at any time. More
broadly speaking, the representativeness of the CMO is crucially dependant on the
contracts it has with its members whereby the coverage of these contracts has to be
interpreted narrowly. As with the MoU, this implies that there cannot be a
40 CMO Directive, Art. 13(3).
41 CMO Directive, Art. 13(3).
42 CMO Directive, Art. 21(1)(a) and (b).
43 CMO Directive, Art. 21(1)(c), (e), (f), (g) and (i).
44 CMO Directive, Art. 21(1)(j).
45 CMO Directive, Art. 22.
46 CMO Directive, Annex (2)(b) and (c).
47 This information has to be provided to right holders, under CMO Directive, Art. 18.
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presumption of CMO representativeness. The second key significance of the CMO
Directive is in its rules on non-members. If revenues are collected for works which
are not covered by the CMO’s own catalogue, the CMO must actively search for the
right holder. It also has to keep the revenues collected in a separate account for at
least three years, ensuring that a right holder can still be paid even if some time has
passed. In addition, the non-member receives access to information under the
transparency rules. These should enable him to identify if a CMO is likely to have
collected revenue due to him, even if he cannot determine how much it is.
Furthermore, by ensuring that CMOs make their dispute resolution procedures
public and actively provide information on them, they facilitate the process of right
holders using them.
2.3 The Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
In practice, neither the MoU nor the CMO Directive48 has solved the issue of the
collective licensing of OOC works by CHIs sufficiently. The DSM Proposal would
introduce for the first time a solution for the mass-digitisation rights clearance issues
faced by CHIs. In the compromise text of the Proposal, Art. 7(1) provides that:
Member States shall provide that a collective management organisation, in
accordance with its mandates, may conclude a non-exclusive licence for non-
commercial purposes with a cultural heritage institution for the reproduction,
distribution, communication to the public or making available to the public of
out-of-commerce works or other subject-matter permanently in the collection
of the institution, irrespective of whether all rightholders covered by the
licence have mandated the collective management organisation …49
Most notably, Art. 7 defines the context in which a CMO may grant a licence to a
CHI. Article 7 applies to the distribution and not only digitisation, communication
to the public and making available online, as long as the licenses are not exclusive.
In other words, the CHI will at no point be able to exclude any third party from
using the work online, as long as the grant of such a licence falls within its mandate.
The aim of Art. 7 of the DSM Proposal in this sense is clearly meant to allow the use
of material held by CHIs in both a tangible and intangible form for their non-
commercial activities. The list of economic activities covered marks the maximum
scope of a possible voluntary agreement between a CMO and a CHI, not the
entitlement of the licensee. In other words, agreements as narrow as only allowing
for communication to the public or making available online also benefit from the
ECL effect as long as the voluntary agreements are non-exclusive and for non-
commercial purposes. In other words, the scope of the license is entirely determined
by the voluntary agreement, not by the provision providing for the extended effect.
It is, as a result, also possible that different CMOs are most representative for the
48 Or indeed the Orphan Works Directive which is deemed too expensive due to the diligent search
requirement. Janssens and Tryggvadottir (2014), p. 36.
49 2016/0280 (COD), Brussels, 25 May 2018.
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different activities and indeed more than one ECL may be required to cover all of
the activities listed in the DSM Proposal.
In terms of representativeness, the Directive Proposal states under Art. 7(1)(a):
‘‘the collective management organisation is, on the basis of mandates from
rightholders, sufficiently representative of rightholders in the type of works or other
subject-matter and of the rights which are the subject of the licence.’’
Most notably, the DSM Proposal combines the notions laid out earlier. On one
hand, it refers to the type of works and other subject-matter as already known from
the MoU, while the notion of mandate referred to in the DSM is essentially a
codification of the CMO Directive’s provisions; the basis for any assessment has to
be the contracts a CMO has with its members. Therefore, only explicitly listed items
may be taken into consideration – there is no possibility to extend the interpretation
of the scope under the law. In addition to the general rule, the DSM Proposal further
specifies that representativeness is to be assessed in relation to the country where the
CHI is established50: ‘‘Member States shall ensure that the licences referred to in
paragraph 1 are sought from a collective management organisation that is
representative for the Member State where the cultural heritage institution is
established.’’
The underlying assumption is that the CMO in the member state where a work
was first published is likely to be most representative.51 Article 7(5) of the
compromise text of the DSM Proposal no longer defines the circumstances of when
a work is to be considered first published or broadcast in a member state. Instead,
the proposed provision excludes ‘‘sets of out-of-commerce works’’, if following the
reasonable effort to determine commercial availability, there is evidence to suggest
that the work or other subject-matter originates from a third country. Point
(a) defines works or other subject-matter (with the exception of cinematographic
and audio-visual works) as originating from a third country where they were first
published or broadcast. Regarding audio-visual or cinematographic works, in point
(b), the headquarters or habitual residence provide the location identification
criteria. Point (c) is the residual provision according to which the OOC work or
other subject-matter of a third country national is excluded from the application of
the regime when a member state or a third country cannot be determined, after a
reasonable effort, according to points (a) and (b).52 This last point addresses the
critique against the initial text of the DSM Proposal according to which there was no
built-in presumption that works that could not be clearly identified as EU works
were automatically deemed non-EU works. Finally Art. 7(5) in fine specifies that the
regime does not apply to sets of OOC works from a third country unless the CMO is
sufficiently representative of rights holders in that third country in the meaning of
50 DSM Proposal, Art. 7(4).
51 Guibault (2015). This has the side effect of reducing the foreign authors issue. If an ECL scheme is
based on the jurisdiction of the user, then a large part of the affected works are potentially from another
country, especially if the language is common. As a result, the percentage of foreign authors increases and
with it the probable size of the non-member portion. Strowel (2011), p. 669.
52 The Orphan Works Directive includes a similar rule. Directive 2012/28/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works [hereinafter
Orphan Works Directive], OJ L 299, 27.10.2012, pp. 5–12 especially Arts. 1 and 3.
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Art. 7(1)(a). The global representativeness of a CMO, i.e. whether it is sufficiently
representative of rights holders in the member state where the CHI is located and in
the third country XXXX, will be a matter of evidence to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis.
The last provision de facto defining the notion of mandate in the DSM Proposal
relates to opt-outs in Art. 7(1)(c): ‘‘all rightholders may at any time exclude the
possibility for collective management organisations to license their works or other
subject-matter in accordance with this Article, either in general or in specific cases,
or exclude the application of any licence granted in accordance with this Article to
their works or other subject-matter.’’
This provision has to be read in combination with Art. 8(a)(1) which provides the
details of these publicity measures.
Member States shall ensure that information for the purposes of the
identification of the out-of-commerce works or other subject-matter as well
as information about the possibilities of rightholders referred to in Article
7(1)(c), and, as soon as it is available, information on the parties to the licence,
the covered territories and the allowed uses is made publicly accessible in a
single online portal from at least six months before the works or other subject-
matter are distributed, communicated to the public or made available to the
public in accordance with the licence.
These provisions act as a safety mechanism for right holders. CMOs are more likely
to act in their interest when right holders can vote with their feet, e.g. withdraw. The
mechanism also provides a safety valve reducing the impact on right holders
overall; after all, copyright provides for exclusive rights and there may be additional
concerns making a right holder withdraw from the scheme. It should be noted that if
a large number of right holders were to withdraw their consent, it could be
interpreted as the CMO no longer being representative.
The most recent negotiations towards the adoption of the DSM Proposal have
brought about an interesting development in relation to ECLs, outside of the issue of
OOC works. Article 9(a) of the compromise text of the Proposal now puts forward a
set of ‘‘measures to facilitate collecting licensing’’ in the form of collective
licensing with an extended effect. The mechanism follows in large part the one set
up for the collective licensing of OOC works under Art. 7, but is not restricted to
particular types of uses or categories of users. According to paragraph 9(a)(2) the
licensing mechanism would only be applicable ‘‘within well-defined areas of use
where obtaining authorisations from rightholders on an individual basis is typically
onerous and impractical to a degree that makes the required licensing transaction
unlikely due to the nature of the use or of the types of works or other subject-matter
concerned.’’ Such a general application of the ECL system already exists in the laws
of Sweden and Denmark.53 The requirement of representativeness is similar to that
of the Art. 7 of the Proposal.
53 Danish Copyright Act, (Consolidated Act No. 1144 of October 23 rd, 2014), Sec. 50(2); Act on
Copyright in Literary And Artistic Works (Swedish Statute Book, SFS, 1960:729, as amended up to
November 1, 2013), Sec. 42h.
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3 The Essential Building Blocks of a Legitimate ECL Solution
In this section, the notion of representativeness of CMOs dealing with OOC works
is analysed. We maintain that the requirement consists of three distinct but related
aspects: the CMO membership, its mandate and the information of non-CMO
members.
3.1 Broad Representation
Whether generally speaking or for the specific purposes of implementing an ECL
regime, the representative character of the CMO is commonly assessed in relation to
the ‘‘number of authors of a certain type of works which are used in [the country]
within the specified field’’.54 This implies that the notion of representativeness is
essentially a numbers game – whoever has the most members within a certain area.
In practice, no CMO represents all authors and rights holders in its jurisdiction.
There are natural gaps in its membership. First, there are industry sectors which
have not developed a tradition of collective management. One major example is the
film industry and therefore audiovisual works.55 Here, commercial licensing is
traditionally done directly by the right holders themselves. However, significant
gaps exist, even in sectors with a long history of collective management. For
example, the German GEMA is based in a country of 82 million inhabitants but had
less members than the Swedish STIM (with less than 10 million inhabitants).56
Secondly, not all right holders had commercial exploitation on their mind when the
works were created. Collections of CHIs include recordings which were never
intended for commercial use, such as recordings of folk music made by a CHI.
Based on the lack of commercial motive, right holders in these particular works and
recordings are unlikely to have them registered for management by a CMO.57 There
are also some who do not wish to join a CMO for other reasons.58 Thirdly, OOC
works are presumed under this regime to be comparatively old. The older the
objects of protection are, the larger the possibility that the rights have at some point
in time been transferred to a third party, for example through inheritance upon the
author’s death.59 It is highly unlikely that all of these transfers would be
appropriately documented. As a result, the chain of title is difficult if not impossible
54 Danish Copyright Act, (Consolidated Act No. 1144 of 23 October 2014), Sec. 50(2), which reads: ‘‘(2)
Extended collective license may also be invoked by users who, within a specified field, have made an
agreement on the exploitation of works with an organisation comprising a substantial number of authors
of a certain type of works which are used in Denmark within the specified field. However, this does not
apply, if the author has issued a prohibition against use of his work in relation to any of the contracting
parties.’’ [emphais added] This provision is similar to Sec. 38a of the Norwegian Copyright Act; Sec. 42a
of the Swedish Copyright Act; and Sec. 26 of the Finnish Copyright Act. See Bulayenko (2016).
55 Janssens and Tryggvadottir (2014), p. 36.
56 Street et al. (2016).
57 Woods (2010), p. 114.
58 Zhang (2016), p. 653.
59 Zhang (2016), p. 652.
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to ascertain.60 In other words, it is not always clear what a CMO’s repertoire
actually entails in terms of the authors and specific works covered.
In addition, gaps in membership are likely to increase due to EU policy. The
provisions on CMOs in the context of the CMO Directive and the DSM Proposal are
quintessentially contradictory. On one hand, the CMO Directive aims to ensure
competition between CMOs. Rights administration benefits from economies of
scale, meaning that the administration of any particular item gets cheaper the more
items there are overall. CMOs therefore have an incentive to ensure as
comprehensive a membership as possible. The CMO Directive uses this economic
rational to ensure that CMOs are responsive to their members (principal-agent
problem): it allows right holders to choose the one they prefer, irrespective of
location. The underlying logic is that if the right holder can vote with his feet, then
CMOs will become more efficient and responsive to right holder demands by
competing for members. On the other hand, the DSM Proposal presumes a system
of CMO jurisdiction along national borders. For example, it refers to the CMO in
the jurisdiction where the work has been first published. In other words, the DSM
Directive presumes that CMOs do not compete and will not, given that no
alternative mechanism is available. Therefore, if the CMO Directive is a success,
then there will be more than one relevant CMO in the field for each type of right and
work – as is presumed by the MoU. In other words, the tools contradict each other:
they cannot both be successful.
Following the gaps in the membership, it cannot even be presumed that the
largest CMO represents the most right holders for any particular use. It should be
noted that fixed numerical indicators such as ‘‘majority’’ are difficult61: even if there
is only one CMO in a field, it does not automatically imply that it represents a
majority of right holders in a particular field.62 The degree of representativeness is
going to vary by sector and country. Similarly, existing schemes assess the
representativeness in terms of membership always in combination with the second
criterion: mandate. For example, the Danish Ministry of Culture assesses the
representativeness of the CMO as a combination of membership size and the
specific use (exclusive right) in question.63 In other words, while the absolute size of
the membership matters, it can only be understood in respect to the specific right in
question. This means the most representative CMO may differ according to the type
of use. If the CMO Directive is successful in creating inter-CMO competition, this
aspect will gain in importance. In addition, it should be noted at this point that most
jurisdictions only allow for one CMO to actually license the content in the ECL
context.64 This principle should be strengthened as Zhang points out; having more
than one CMO can be confusing for non-members.65
60 This issue has been discussed extensively in respect to the orphan works, see for example Woods
(2010); Ranaivoson et al. (2013), p. 674; or Schroff (2015), pp. 71–78.
61 Riis and Schovsbo (2012), p. 937.
62 Zhang (2016), pp. 667–668; Riis and Schovsbo (2012), p. 937.
63 Hugenholtz et al. (2014), pp. 25–26.
64 The one exception is Finland. See also Zhang (2016), p. 648.
65 Zhang (2016), p. 648.
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3.2 Proper Mandate
The part of the representativeness criterion relating to the user’s ‘‘right to exploit
works of the same nature’’66 directly concerns the CMOs mandate and its capacity
to grant licences with respect to the rights it administers.
To be entitled to grant licences in the first place, whether on behalf of non-
members or not, the CMO must be entrusted by its members with an explicit
mandate to represent specific rights. Following the CMO Directive, these rights
have to be explicitly listed.67 In the context of the digitisation and dissemination of
presumably old(er) cultural heritage material, the question whether the CMO has
obtained from the rights owners, their heirs or assignees, the necessary mandate to
administer the digital rights in these older works is very relevant. New uses such as
online use can also not be automatically presumed to have been transferred, with the
rules varying significantly between member states.68 A CMO managing the rights in
a particular work can therefore not necessarily license online use if its mandate is
based on older contracts, in particular from the pre-digital age. In practice, the CMO
has to actively update the contracts. This can be a major administrative burden69 not
many CMOs will have fully complied with.70 Therefore, older contracts and rights
fragmentation mean that even if the rights in a particular copyright work are
managed by a CMO, the mandate does not necessarily cover all economic rights.
Current practice shows how this requirement can be implemented, and equally
important how it cannot. The Danish Ministry of Culture assesses the representa-
tiveness of the CMO in its decision, interpreting this as a combination of
membership size and the specific use (exclusive right) in question.71 In other words,
the Ministry of Culture considers the mandate the CMO has from its members both
in respect of the type of work and the exclusive right in questions. In this context,
the CMO’s statutes and therefore membership contracts form part of this
examination.72 Similarly, in the case of OOC works published in Germany before
1 January 196673 in books, journals, newspapers, magazines or in other writings, the
66 Danish Copyright Act, Sec. 50(3): ‘‘The extended collective license gives the user right to exploit
other works of the same nature even though the authors of those works are not represented by the
organisation’’. This provision is similar to Norwegian Copyright Act, Sec. 26; Finnish Copyright Act,
Sec. 26(1); Swedish Copyright Act, Sec. 42a: ’’The extended collective license confers to the user the
right to exploit works of the kind referred to in the agreement […]‘‘.
67 See CMO Directive, Art. 5(1) and (7).
68 Dusollier et al. (2014), p. 35.
69 This is explicitly recognised in the proposed Directive under recital 19 which states: ‘‘A requirement
for the consent of rightholders in the authorisation to the management of each right, category of rights or
type of works and other subject-matter should not prevent the rightholders from accepting proposed
subsequent amendments to that authorisation by tacit agreement in accordance with the conditions set out
in national law.’’
70 On the discussion about CMOs and knowledge of their own repertoire and rights, see Schroff (2015).
71 For a detailed discussion, see Hugenholtz et al. (2014), pp. 25–26.
72 Hugenholtz et al. (2014), p. 26.
73 Using a cut-off date like this has the practical side effect that works before this date are presumed out-
of commerce, negating the need for a search and therefore reducing the overall costs. Janssens and
Tryggvadottir (2014), p. 33.
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OOC provision in the German Collective Management Organisations Act explicitly
states that only those CMOs which already manage the specific right in question are
presumed to manage the rights of non-members.74 For more recent works, Sec. 137l
of the German Copyright Act establishes another presumption of grant of rights on
older works with respect to new types of uses:
(1) Where between 1 January 1966 and 1 January 2008, the author has granted
another person all essential rights of use, exclusively as well as without
limitation of place and time, the rights of use which were not known at the
time the contract was concluded shall be deemed also to have been granted to
the other person, so far as the author does not indicate to the other person that
he objects to such use. In respect of types of use that were already known on 1
January 2008 the objection may be made only within one year. Otherwise the
right of objection shall expire after three months have elapsed since the other
person sent the author, at the address last known to the sender, the information
concerning the intended commencement of the new type of use of the author’s
work. The first to third sentences shall not apply to rights of use which have
become known in the meantime and which the author has already granted to a
third person.75
On the basis of these provisions, the contract signed between the VG Wort (the
German CMO for writings) and its authors and publishers provides for the explicit
grant of all rights necessary to allow the proper licensing of OOC works of their
members, including the rights arising from Secs. 16, 19a and 137l of the Copyright
Act or Sec. 51 of the Collective Management Organisations Act.76
By contrast, the former French OOC system, created pursuant to the Act No.
2012-287 of March 1, 2012, on the Digital Exploitation of Unavailable Books of the
20th Century and the implementing decree No 2013-182,77 gave a prime example of
a CMO operating on the basis of an insufficient mandate. The Act essentially
established a system made up of two components. First, the law created a free and
publicly accessible database of OOC books, known as the Registre des Livres
Indisponibles en Re´e´dition E´lectronique (ReLIRE), to be administered by the
Bibliothe`que nationale de France (BNF). The second component concerned the
licensing of these OOC books. When a book had been entered in the database for
74 Collective Management Organisations Act, Sec. 51: ‘‘it shall be presumed that a collecting society
which manages the rights of reproduction (§16, Copyright Act) and of making works available to the
public (§19a, Copyright Act) in out-of-commerce works and which is authorised to do so (§77) is
authorised, within its scope of activity, to also grant users these rights in works of those rightholders who
have not mandated the collecting society with the management of their rights’’. Translation available at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_vgg/englisch_vgg.html.
75 Translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html.
76 See Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort, ‘‘Wahrnehmungsvertrag’’, available at: http://www.vgwort.de/
fileadmin/pdf/wahrnehmungsvertrag/Muster_Wahrnehmungsvertrag_Autor_10.9.16.pdf. For a detailed
legal analysis, please see, Ahlberg and Go¨tting (2018), VGG § 51, especially for the overlap between the
old 13th WahrnG and the new law.
77 Decree No 2013-182 of 27 February 2013, implementing Arts. L. 134-1 to L. 134-9 of the French
Intellectual Property Code and relating to the digital exploitation of out-of-print 20th century books)
(JORF No 51 of 1 March 2013, p. 3835).
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more than six months and had not been subject to an opt-out by the right holder or
author, the Act stated that the right to authorise its (commercial) reproduction and
representation in digital form was to be exercised by a collecting society recognised
by the Minister of Culture, the SOFIA. In May 2013, two French authors of literary
works, Mr Soulier and Ms Doke, filed a request with the Conseil d’E´tat (Council of
State, France). The Conseil d’E´tat stayed the proceedings and referred the case to
the CJEU, asking the Court to issue a preliminary ruling on the following question:
Do Articles 2 and 5 Information Society Directive preclude legislation, such as
that established in Articles L. 134-1 to L. 134-9 CPI, that gives approved
collecting societies the right to authorise the reproduction and the represen-
tation in digital form of ‘‘out-of-print books’’, while allowing the authors of
those books, or their successors in title, to oppose or put an end to that
practice, on the conditions that it lays down?78
The CJEU confirmed that the French law was too broad to fit into any of the
exceptions provided for in the Information Society Directive.79 As a result, the law
must comply with the economic rights. Since the economic rights are exclusive
rights, their exercise required the consent of the right holder. The Court held that the
provisions of the Information Society Directive should not be interpreted as
requiring explicit consent80; there are situations – for example, in relation to the
interpretation of the concept of ‘‘new public’’ – in which the author can be presumed
to have agreed implicitly.81 However, valid implied consent is subject to necessary
pre-conditions, namely that every author is actually informed of the future use of his
work by a third party, and that he has the means at his disposal to prohibit it if he so
wishes.82 The court, however, did not actually address the question of mandate as
such and instead chose to focus on implied consent.
It is our contention that the Court of Justice should have gone further in its
reasoning and not limit itself to the examination of the registration of books in the
ReLIRE database. To include a book in a publicly accessible list held by the BNF
cannot be regarded as authorising the SOFIA to grant commercial exploitation
licenses to third parties. It follows from the recently implemented Collective
Management Directive,83 that the mandate of a CMO cannot be presumed. It must
be laid down specifically either in the law or in the exploitation contract binding the
rights owner to the CMO. In the case of the SOFIA and the management of rights of
reproduction and making available to the public of OOC works, Art. L. 134-3-I CPI
78 Soulier and Doke, para. 24.
79 Soulier and Doke.
80 Soulier and Doke, para. 35.
81 See especially Nils Svensson and Others v. Retriever Sverige AB, Case C-466/12, Judgment of 13
February 2014 – Svensson, paras. 25–28, 31.
82 Soulier and Doke, paras. 35–39.
83 CMO Directive as implemented in France by Ordonnance n 2016-1823 du 22 de´cembre 2016 portant
transposition de la directive 2014/26/UE du Parlement europe´en et du Conseil du 26 fe´vrier 2014
concernant la gestion collective du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins et l’octroi de licences
multiterritoriales de droits sur des œuvres musicales en vue de leur utilisation en ligne dans le marche´
inte´rieur, Art. L. 322-3 CPI.
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states that ‘‘where a book has been entered in the database referred to in Article
L. 134-2 for more than six months, the right to authorise its reproduction and
representation in digital form is exercised by [a CMO], approved for that purpose by
the Minister of Culture.’’
The above provision merely states that the rights are ‘‘exercised by’’ the relevant
CMO, e.g. SOFIA. Article L. 134-3-I CPI creates no express presumption and
operates no explicit statutory transfer of rights in favour of the SOFIA. Simply
stating that the SOFIA exercises the right to authorise an OOC work’s reproduction
and representation in digital form does not convey any valid right on the SOFIA.
This is in sharp contrast with Art. L. 122-10 CPI, for example, which creates an
explicit transfer of the author’s right of reprographic reproduction in favour of the
Centre Franc¸ais de la Copie (CFC).84 At most, Art. L. 134-3-I CPI suggests a
presumption of mandate in favour of SOFIA, not an express transfer of rights.
As the text of the law is insufficient to give the SOFIA a clear mandate, the CMO
needs to acquire the express permission from the rights owners to exercise the rights
on their behalf. Until 2018, the deed of adhesion that authors signed upon joining
SOFIA made no reference to the rights relating to unavailable books. The deed of
adhesion was modified after the Conseil d’E´tat concluded with respect to the illegal
character of Arts. L. 134-1 to 9 CPI, thereby reaffirming the finding of the CJEU in
the Soulier and Doke case.85 By adhering to the SOFIA, authors now agree
[f]or all countries and for the duration of the Society, to bring under its
management (‘‘apporte en ge´rance’’) the following rights with respect to all
[his/her] existing and future works that are covered by a publishing contract: –
remuneration for public lending, – Remuneration for digital private copying, –
right of rental, – remuneration for the exploitation of unavailable books in
digital form, – sums coming from the CFC.86
French copyright law distinguishes between two forms of transfers: ‘‘apport
simple’’ and ‘‘apport en ge´rance’’. The first brings the rights from the right holder to
the CMO in full ownership, while the second only confers a right to exercise the
right.87 To be able to authorise or prohibit acts of reproduction and making available
to the public of OOC works, i.e. to be able to grant licences to third parties, the deed
of adhesion to the SOFIA would have required an ‘‘apport simple’’ of both of these
rights, but neither is mentioned in the list. Instead, the role of the SOFIA generally
consists in negotiating, collecting and distributing the sums of money collected by
84 Intellectual Property Code, Art. L. 122-5-10 first sentence reads as follows: ‘‘The publication of a work
shall imply assignment of the right of reprographic reproduction to a society governed by Title II of Book
III and approved to such end by the Minister responsible for culture.’’
85 Conseil d’Etat, Decision of 7 June 2017, N 368208, ECLI:FR:CECHR:2017:368208.20170607.
86 CFC collects the reprography fees. SOFIA Adhesion deed states: ‘‘Je fais apport en ge´rance, pour tous
pays et pour la dure´e de la Socie´te´, sur toutes mes œuvres cre´e´es et futures faisant l’objet d’un contrat
d’e´dition, des droits suivants : re´mune´ration au titre du preˆt en bibliothe`que, – re´mune´ration pour copie
prive´e nume´rique, – droit de location, – re´umune´ration au titre de l’exploitation des livres indisponibles
en re´e´dition e´lectronique,– sommes en provenance du Centre Franc¸ais d’exploitation du droit de Copie’’.
See http://www.la-sofia.org/sofia/webdav/site/Sofia/shared/Adh%C3%A9sion%20auteur/Acte%20adh%
C3%A9sion%20Auteur%20Sofia.pdf.
87 Ne´risson (2013), p. 155.
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the relevant CMOs, on the basis of remuneration rights paid in respect of works
covered by a publishing contract. Moreover, no implied or indirect licence in favour
of SOFIA should be read into any publishing contract signed between authors and
‘‘publishers having the right to reproduce the work in printed form’’. SOFIA’s daily
business is not that of granting licenses for the exploitation of works on the basis of
exclusive rights. In the absence of an unequivocal permission obtained directly from
the rights owners, the SOFIA therefore did not have a legitimate mandate to grant
licences pursuant to Art. L. 134-6 CPI.
Coming back to the Soulier and Doke case, the obligation placed by the CJEU on
the SOFIA to actually and individually inform rights owners about the ReLIRE
system cannot remedy the absence of a proper mandate. Such a mandate is
paramount, not only for the good functioning of the relationship between a CMO
and its members but also for the establishment of any valid system of ECL.
Furthermore, ECL schemes are based on the representativeness of the CMO to
justify the inclusion of non-members in the licenses that are issued.88 The
representativeness of a CMO can only be assessed in relation to the CMO’s
membership, where the membership exists either by virtue of the law (for example,
through a valid presumption of transfer) or of a contractual arrangement. The fact
that the CJEU in the Soulier and Doke decision makes no reference to the SOFIA’s
mandate or to its relationship with members or with potential non-members could be
construed as an additional indication that the French system was alien to any kind of
extended collective licensing system. In any case, Art. L. 134-4 CPI lists among the
requirements with which a CMO must comply the obligation to be recognised by the
Ministry of Culture, but nowhere does it refer to the obligation of the CMO to be
representative of the rights holders whose rights it administers.
3.3 Obligation to Inform and the Notion of Tacit Approval
Finally, even if a CMO represents a broad number of rights owners and has a proper
mandate, any OOC scheme needs to provide for an efficient mechanism to allow
authors and right holders to end the OOC status of a work.89 In this respect, no
formalities should apply.90 In other words, opt-outs need to be facilitated as much as
possible, thus lowering the threshold. This means in practice that the mechanism has
to: (1) reach the largest number of CMO non-members; (2) clearly explain, through
the information provided, the purpose and scope of the agreement; and (3) be as
easy and inexpensive for the non-member as possible.91
While the decision in Soulier and Doke does not apply to ECLs, its discussion of
tacit approval needs to be considered. In particular, while the Court of Justice in
88 This is discussed in more detail below.
89 This principle is well established, see for example the MoU, principle 2.5 or the Orphan Works
Directive, Art. 5.
90 Opinion of AG Wathelet, para. 40; Soulier and Doke, paras. 50–51. It should be noted that the Berne
Convention in principle prohibits formalities but it is does not prohibit an opt-out scheme as such. Zhang
(2016), p. 665.
91 Ginsburg (2017), p. 6.
Extended Collective Licensing for the Use of…
123
Soulier and Doke invalidated the French system based on implied consent, as it
infringed upon the exclusive rights granted under the Information Society Directive,
the question of tacit approval by authors remains, not least because it was not
excluded per se.92 As a result, it is in principle possible that a narrower licensing
scheme can be based on tacit approval, subject to information requirements,
provided the CMO has a solid mandate from its members in the first place. The
following discussion will outline the principles that should be complied with in the
context of OOC schemes to ensure that the requirements of tacit approval by the
right holder(s) are met.
Under Art. 7(3)(c) DSM Proposal, the ECL effect is conditional on an opt-out
possibility by the right holder. It is clear from case law that this burden cannot be
too onerous for the right holder. The Court held in Soulier and Doke that the author
of a work must be able to put an end to the exercise, by a third party, of rights of
exploitation in digital format without having to submit beforehand to a formality
which consists in proving that he is the sole owner of the right in the work.93 Here
the specific opt-outs built into the French system were problematic and
demonstrated a system which was too burdensome in practice.94
There were several ways in which a book could be withdrawn from the French
ReLIRE database and therefore be removed from the OOC scheme. In general, the
author of an unavailable book or the publisher having the right of reproduction in a
printed form of this book could oppose in written form the exercise of the right of
authorisation by the SOFIA no later than six months after the entry of the book in
the ReLIRE database. After this date, the hurdles for opting-out were higher. The
author and the publisher having the right to reproduce an unavailable book in
printed form could at any time jointly notify the SOFIA of their decision to
withdraw from the scheme. The publisher who objected to the inclusion of his book
in the ReLIRE database must proceed with the digital exploitation of that book
within two years of the notification of his opposition. If the publisher failed to
exploit the work, the rights reverted back to the SOFIA. In other words, even if the
publisher was the sole right holder, he had to meet additional requirements to
exercise his exclusive right – to acquire consent from the author and actively exploit
the work digitally.
In addition to these general rules, two additional opt-outs were available for
authors. First, after the expiration of the first six months, the author of an
unavailable book could oppose the exercise of the right of reproduction or
representation of that book if he considered that the reproduction or representation
of the book was likely to harm his honour or reputation.95 This was essentially an
implementation of the moral right of authors to withdraw works but in line with it,
the threshold of proof was rather high. Secondly, the author of an unavailable book
could at any time decide to withdraw individually from the scheme, but only
provided he proved sole ownership of the right to authorise the reproduction and
92 Soulier and Doke para. 35.
93 Soulier and Doke, paras. 46–51.
94 Bulayenko (2016).
95 Intellectual Property Code, Art. L. 134-4 I third indent.
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representation of the book in digital form.96 However, trying to establish in
evidence that certain exclusive rights in OOC works have not been transferred to a
third party is virtually impossible in practice. Overall, the burden of actions which
needed to be taken to opt-out after the first six months in particular were considered
onerous by the Court, constituting a non-permissible formality under the Berne
Convention.97 In this sense, the Soulier and Doke case essentially shows how it
cannot be done.
It also follows from Soulier and Doke that the efforts to inform authors who are
not CMO members are crucial. Indeed, the CMO Directive already imposes clear
transparency measures on CMOs: they have to publish information on their internal
organisation, their revenue collection, their agreements (at least the standard ones)
and dispute mechanisms. Most importantly here though, CMOs are required to
actively trace right holders which are not members but for whose works revenues
were collected.98 It further states that this search has to be carried out first via
contacting other CMOs and at a later stage the public at large if earlier attempts to
identify the right holder were not successful. In other words, CMOs are already
under an obligation to actively trace non-members. Under Art. 9 DSM Proposal, the
role of publicity measures as part of the stakeholder dialogue is highlighted. The
difference to the CMO Directive is the focus: while the CMO Directive focuses on
the individual, the DSM Proposal centers on the organisational level. It therefore
follows that under EU law, tacit approval requires transparency and efforts to trace
right holders as far as is reasonable. Tacit approval here has to be interpreted as
ensuring that as many authors and right holders as possible are informed of the OOC
scheme in general and the use of their work in particular.
It should be noted here that this problem of large numbers of unknown right
holders is not new and a precedent has been set in the Orphan Works Directive
(Directive 2012/28/EU, hereinafter OWD). The OWD sought a way to deal with
works the authors and rights holders of which are unknown or untraceable, thereby
preventing CHIs from obtaining permission to use these works. To ensure all
possible avenues are covered, the OWD’s Annex lists the kinds of sources which
can hold right holder and authorship information, based on the principle that a
relevant right holder or author can be identified and contacted if the listed
institutions are consulted. With the exception of general registers to identify a work
as such, all sources on individuals either refer to CMOs or associations of particular
stakeholder groups.99 In this respect, CMOs and stakeholder associations are
presumed to have sufficient links with the relevant creative community to identify
and reach relevant right holders and authors. If they all fail, then the right holder/
author is presumed to be unidentifiable.
In other words, it is already established in EU law that CMOs in combination
with interest associations provide the largest possible coverage of the relevant
creative community. This reasoning in turn also means that the established networks
96 Intellectual Property Code, Art. L. 134-6, second sentence.
97 Soulier and Doke, paras. 49–51.
98 CMO Directive, Art. 13(3).
99 Orphan Works Directive, Annex; Schroff et al. (2016), p. 286.
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maintained by CMOs and stakeholder associations provide the most extensive
information network. After all, each of these organisations has their own network
and channels of communication with their members as well as the relevant creative
community more broadly. This includes, for example, providing for forums for
discussion, an online presence as well as active participation at key industry events
or major conventions. In addition, CMOs should publish information on the
agreements, works and right holders not identified as well as the mechanisms to
claim royalties on their websites.100 As a result, relying on these established
networks, the details of a licensing scheme can be communicated as widely as
possible within the relevant community. In combination with the narrow scope of
the schemes, this will most likely satisfy the notification and tacit approval
requirements of non-members.
4 Conclusion
As the previous discussion has shown, existing EU law, case and soft law as well as
the DSM Proposal, provide significant guidance on what minimum criteria a CMO
needs to meet in the context of extended collective licensing. In particular, only a
proper mandate and treatment of non-members can make any ECL legitimate. The
following key principles can be ascertained. First, without an underlying legal
provision, CMOs licensing works of non-members are consciously overstepping
their boundaries as they license something to which they have no claim. This means
that ECL schemes need to have a basis in the law at all times. Secondly, CMOs need
to manage the kind of right in the type of work in question: only if they already have
an explicit mandate from their members to manage these rights in works, can a
CMO issue licenses. This has to be the fundamental pillar of all licensing schemes
involving OOC works as it influences all other aspects. Thirdly, the CMO has to be
representative of the right holders affected by an OOC scheme. As demonstrated in
this article, while most commentators see this as a question of absolute membership
size, this can be misleading. There are gaps in the membership and their size and
relevance will vary according to the type of right, the type of work and proposed use
in question. As a result, it is the combination of membership size with the type of
work, exclusive right and nature of the work ((e.g. non-commercial works (as
discussed above), age, etc.)) which needs to be taken into account.
ECL schemes can only be sufficiently legitimate to presume tacit approval by
non-members if this assessment of the three criteria is carried out carefully. Finally,
any ECL scheme needs to actively seek to inform authors and right holders. While
this is already an obligation under the CMO Directive, informing non-members is
crucial for the notion of tacit approval and therefore the coverage of non-members.
The new aspect here is that in addition to tracing individual right holders, large-
scale publication efforts are required under the DSM Proposal. It has been argued
here that this can best be achieved by cooperating with the key organisations
identified by the OWD, a Directive which addresses a similar issue. By including a
100 Zhang (2016), p. 668.
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range of stakeholder organisations – all of which have links and communication
channels to their respective communities – authors are more likely to be aware of an
ECL system, strengthening the case for tacit approval.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Ahlberg H, Go¨tting H-P (eds) (2018) BeckOK Urheberrecht, 20th edn. C.H. Beck, Munich
Axhamn J, Guibault L (2011) Solving Europeana’s mass-digitization issues through extended collective
licensing? Nord Intellect Prop Law Rev 6:509–516
Bensamoun A (2014) The French out-of-commerce books law in the light of the European Orphan Works
Directive. Queen Mary J Intellect Prop 4(3):213–225
Beunen A, Guibault L (2011) Brussels Memorandum of Understanding inzake digitalisering en online
beschikbaarstelling van out-of-commerce boeken en tijdschriften. AMI 6:221–229
Bulayenko O (2016) Permissibility of non-voluntary collective management of copyright under EU Law
– the case of the French law on out-of-commerce books. JIPITEC 7(1):51–68
Busse T (2018) Crossing the digital rubicon: Google Books and the dawn of an electronic literature
revolution. Houst Bus Tax Law J 18:119–149
Drexl J, Ne´risson S, Trumpke F (2013) Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property
and Competition Law on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights
in musical works for online uses in the internal market COM (2012)372. Int Rev Intellect Prop
Compet Law 44(3):263–292
Dusollier S, Ker C, Iglesias M, Smits Y (2014) Contractual arrangements applicable to creators: law and
practice of selected member states. Study for the European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493041/IPOL-JURI_ET%282014%29493041_EN.pdf. Acces-
sed 6 June 2018
Ginsburg J (2017) Extended collective licenses in international treaty perspective: issues and statutory
implementation. Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-564. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068997. Accessed 6 June 2018
Gomez P, Keller P (2015) The missing decades: the 20th century black hole in Europeana. http://pro.
europeana.eu/blogpost/the-missing-decades-the-20th-century-black-hole-in-europeana. Accessed 6
July 2017
Guibault L (2014) Collective rights management directive. In: Stamatoudi I, Torremans P (eds) Copyright
law in the European Union. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 696–796
Guibault L (2015) Cultural heritage online? Settle it in the country of origin of the work. JIPITEC
6(3):173–191
Haunss S (2013) The changing role of collecting societies in the Internet. Internet Policy Rev 3(3):1–8
Hugenholtz B, Van Gompel S, Guibault L, Obradovic R (2014) Extended collective licensing: panacee
voor massadigitalisering? Institute for Information Law, Amsterdam. https://www.ivir.nl/
publicaties/download/1471.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2017
Janssens M-C, Tryggvadottir R (2014) Facilitating access to orphan and out of commerce works to make
Europe’s cultural resources available to the broader public. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2538097. Accessed 6 June 2018
Janssens M-C, Tryggvadottir R (2016) Orphan works, out-of-commerce works and making the European
cultural heritage available: ‘are we nearly there yet’? In: Stamatoudi I (ed) New developments in EU
and international copyright law. Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 189–209
Kretschmer M (2005) Access and reward in the information society: regulating the collective
management of copyright. http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/71496/. Accessed 6 July 2017
Extended Collective Licensing for the Use of…
123
Metzger A, Heinemann T (2015) The Right of the author to grant licenses for non-commercial use:
creative commons licenses and the directive on collective management. JIPITEC 6(1):11–22
Ne´risson S (2013) La gestion collective des droits des auteurs en France et en Allemagne: quelle
le´gitimite´?. Institut de Recherche Juridique de la Sorbonne, Paris
Ranaivoson H, Iglesias M, Vondracek A (2013) The costs of licensing for online music services: an
exploratory analysis for European states. Mich State Int Law Rev 21(3):666–686
Riis T, Schovsbo J (2012) Extended collective licenses in action. Int Rev Intellect Prop Compet Law
43(8):930–950
Schroff S (2015) Europeana sounds and copyrights: the need for and challenges in licensing archival
materials. Institute for Information Law, Amsterdam. http://pro.europeana.eu/files/Europeana_
Professional/Projects/Project_list/Europeana_Sounds/Other%20documents%20related%20to%
20the%20project/Europeana%20Report%20by%20IVIR%20final.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2017
Schroff S, Street J (2017) The politics of the digital single market: culture vs. competition vs. copyright.
Inf Commun Soc. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2017.1309445
Schroff S, Favale M, Bertoni A (2016) The impossible quest: problems with diligent search for orphan
works. Int Rev Intellect Prop Compet Law 48(3):286–304
Street J, Laing D, Schroff S (2016) Regulating for creativity and cultural diversity: the case of collective
management organisations and the music industry. Int J Cult Policy 40(3):227–259
Strowel A (2011) The European extended collective licensing model. Columbia J Law Arts 34:665–669
Woods T (2010) Multi-territorial licensing and the evolving role of collective management organisation.
In: Gervais D (ed) Collective management of copyright and related rights, 2nd edn. Kluwer Law
International, Alpen aan de Rijn, pp 105–134
Zhang Z (2016) Transplantation of an extended collective licensing system – lessons from Denmark. Int
Rev Intellect Prop Compet Law 47(6):640–672
L. Guibault, S. Schroff
123
